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of classification may be regarded as one of only academic im-
portance.
42
PARTICULAR CONTRACTS
J. Denson Smith*
The decisions of the First Circuit Court of Appeal and the
Supreme Court in McCauley v. Manda Brothers Provisions Co.'
do not dissipate the obscurity that surrounds the theory on
which recovery may be based in products liability cases. The
court of appeal found a retailer of a hot sausage sandwich wrap-
ped in cellulose and stapled not liable to the purchaser because
of the absence of a showing of negligence or of knowledge of
its unwholesomeness. The manufacturer of the sausage who sold
to a preparer of sandwiches was also held not liable because the
evidence precluded a finding of responsibility on its part.
Finally, the preparer was held liable to the purchaser from the
retailer apparently on the theory that a preparer of food is
presumed to know its condition and warrants its wholesomeness.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari at the request of the
preparer, who did not complain of being cast but was seeking
merely to enforce contribution against the retailer. The plain-
tiff did not apply for certiorari. The Supreme Court affirmed
the holding of the court of appeal, which had reversed the
district court's judgment insofar as the retailer was concerned
for lack of a showing of negligence on the retailer's part. It also
rejected the preparer's claim in contribution because of the re-
tailer's freedom from negligence. In passing, it noted that the
judgment of the district court had not cast the preparer and
retailer as joint tortfeasors but that each was cast on the basis
of warranty. In a concurring opinion, Judge Sanders observed
that since 1911 a manufacturer has been held liable for damages
42. It is noteworthy that in France both delictual action and action de in rem
verso are subject to the long prescriptive term of thirty years. See FRENCH CIv.
CODE art. 2262; 3 DEMOGUE, TRAITIl DES OBLIGATIONS EN Gt NtRAL 290 (1923) ;
Cass. Civ., July 18, 1910, D.1911.I.355. However, in some instances the running
of the prescriptive term for the criminal action-which is always shorter-will
preclude the civil action. For a discussion of this delicate problem see 2 SAVATIER,
TRAIT DE LA iRESPONSABILITE CIV1lE EN DROIT FRANQAIS 227-37 (2d ed. 1951).
In Louisiana, instead, there is an important difference between the prescriptive
periods of articles 3536 and 3544 of the Civil Code which seems to be the real reason
why the court felt inclined to allow the exceptional remedy in the instant case
on grounds of the general principle contained in Article 1965, which has no
equivalent in the French Civil Code.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 202 So.2d 492 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967) affirmed 252 La. 528, 211 So.2d
637 (1968).
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caused by unwholesome food products either on a delictual
theory or a theory of implied warranty. He noted that running
throughout the cases is a conclusive presumption that a man-
ufacturer knows of the unwholesomeness of the food product
he prepares and said that this was consistent with the fault
requirement of Civil Code Article 2315 covering delictual re-
sponsibility. He expressed the opinion that Civil Code Article
2531 negates the retailer's liability for damages under a war-
ranty theory, and he also said that the weight of authority sup-
ports the view that a retailer is under no duty to open sealed
containers and hence is not at fault in failing to do so.
As far as the retailer is concerned, unless knowledge of un-
wholesomeness can be imputed to him, no recovery of damages
is permissible on a warranty theory and if there is no evidence
of mishandling on his part recovery on a delictual theory is
likewise precluded under existing jurisprudence. With respect
to one who supplies a retailer, the situation is different. If he is
the manufacturer or preparer the case of LeBlanc v. Louisiana
Coca Cola Bottling Co. 2 would permit recovery by the consumer
provided the product is marketed in a sealed container. Thus,
the preparer in the instant case would be responsible on a theory
of implied warranty provided the stapled cellulose wrapper
should be treated the same as, say, a capped bottle. The opinion
of the court of appeal seemed not to adopt this view, however,
but found, on the contrary, a warranty running to the pur-
chaser on the basis of the principle applied in Doyle v. Fuerst &
Kraemer, Ltd., which imputes knowledge to a preparer of food
products. The difficulty with this position, however, is that the
preparer in Doyle sold to the consumer, thereby establishing a
contractual relationship, whereas the preparer in the instant
case sold to the retailer. Pretermitting consideration of the im-
plied warranty theory of the LeBlanc case, warranty against
redhibitory defects is rooted in contract, but not liability based
directly on fault. The basis of recovery was, therefore, not
clearly articulated. Theoretically it appears, however, that fault
is at the basis of responsibility in damages whether recoverable
in an action of warranty against redhibitory defects or on a
delictual theory. Recovery against a preparer might, therefore,
be based on a finding of fault, without regard to contract, and
this may have been the theory underlying the judgment against
the preparer in the instant case. But there is doubt. There
2. 221 La. 919, 60 So.2d 873 (1952).
3. 129 La. 838, 56 So. 906 (1911).
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remains, nevertheless, a possibility of holding the preparer liable
in damages to the purchaser from the retailer on a warranty
theory without extending the principle of the LeBlanc case to
a wrapped and stapled sandwich. In the case of McEachern v.
Plauchg Lumber and Constr. Co.4 the court held that a buyer, in
that case of a house, acquired his seller's right of action in
warranty against the builder who sold to the latter. Article
2503 of the Civil Code was relied on. By an application of this
principle to the facts of the instant case the purchaser would
succeed to the retailer's action in warranty against the preparer
which would presumably expose the preparer to an action in
damages brought by the purchaser.5 No mention of this pos-
sibility appears in the opinions under consideration.
After shifting its position on rehearing in Young v. Stevens6
the court on second rehearing went back to its original position
and held that slight encroachments by a concrete driveway and
fence belonging to an adjoining property owner rendered un-
merchantable the title to premises contracted to be sold and
described as a single two-story house "on grounds measuring
about 49' x 120' or as per title.' ' G This case will be noted in a
future issue of this Review. The possibility of a difference in
legal consequences between a case involving a mere shortage in
measurement and one where no shortage exists but there is en-
croachment by the adjoining owner will be examined. The
present writer is dubious about attributing controlling impor-
tance to what visual inspection may reveal to a prospective buyer
in cases of this kind.7 What the buyer has in mind may be more
important than what he sees, or thinks he see.
In Shell Oil Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp.s the court
properly found valid and binding an agreement providing for
the determination by arbitrators of a price adjustment in a con-
tract for the sale of natural gas. Each party was to appoint an
arbitrator and the arbitrators so appointed were to select a
third. But the agreement further provided that if one arbitra-
tor was appointed and not another, the one would have power to
make the price determination and that if two were appointed
4. 220 La. 696, 57 So.2d 405 (1952).
5. See POTHIER, CONTRAT DE VENTE nos. 215, 216 (Buguet ed. 1861).
6. Young v. Stevens, 252 La. 69, 209 So.2d 25 (1968).
7. Cf. Favrot & Livaudais v. Stauffer, 112 La. 158, 36 So. 307 (1904), and
Scurria v. Russo, 134 So.2d 679 (La. App. 1961), noted in 23 LA. L. REV. 468
(1968).
8. Shell Oil Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 210 So.2d 554 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1968).
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but did not select a third, then the latter might be appointed
by the senior judge of the Fifth Federal Judicial Circuit. It was
held that since no new act of volition was required by the
parties with respect to the fixing of the price, the agreement
was binding and could not be disregarded. The decision appears
to be a sound reflection of recognized civilian principles and is
also harmonious with the modern liberal approach reflected in
the Uniform Commercial Code. 9 It seems very clear that the
parties did intend to bind themselves and were meticulous in
trying to avoid the rule that nullifies a projected sale where the
price is left to be fixed by arbitrators to be chosen by the parties
and either party fails to do so.
TORTS
Wex S. Malone*
DUTY OF CARE
Negligence as Balancing Process
Occasionally the facts of a controversy invite a sharp focus
upon the essential balancing process that lies at the heart of
negligence. Conduct involving a chance of injury should be char-
acterized as negligent conduct whenever the chance is found to
be unreasonable. Ordinarily "big" chances are more likely to be
regarded as unreasonable than are "little" chances. But even a
very small chance involving only a remote possibility of causing
injury may be recognized as unreasonable, and hence negligent,
if it is a "useless" chance-that is to say, if nothing worth-
while is to be gained by taking it.' Particularly is this true when,
in addition, the risk is of such a nature that the consequences
would be highly serious if it should materialize. The case that
suggested all this ruminating is Allien v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co. 2 The conduct involved was the maintenance by de-
fendant of an uninsulated high voltage electric line at a height
of twenty-eight feet above the surface and at a distance of
twenty-six feet from an abandoned oil well. The picture thus
presented was not one of obvious danger, and there was little
likelihood of injury to anyone on the ground in the absence of
some rare circumstance. Such an unexpected situation did arise,
however, when operators of an oil rig mounted on a truck at-
9. Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-305.
* Boyd Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See the excellent discussion in Terry, Negligence, 29 HAv. L. REv. 40
(1915).
2. 202 So.2d 704 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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